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Fuels


- Extremely dry & susceptible to rapid & explosive spread
- Potential present for extreme fire spread
- Two primary fuel models
 - Fuel Model 2: pinyon-juniper
 - Main carrier of fire was grass
 - Fuel Model 4: Gambel Oak


Fuel Model 4 6' to 12' high Dense & continuous Little dead material Unknown age	No previous recorded fires Unburned live fuel moisture 125% Underburned live fuel moisture 59% Reburn potential


Weather


- Cold front with high winds (up to 45 MPH) passed over fire, July 6 afternoon
- Several Red Flag Warnings issued before South Canyon Fire started
- Period of drought; 58% of normal precipitation
- Detailed fire weather & behavior info not transmitted to FF's

The Colorado River Wind Chute South Barrier Britania Paris Paris Colorado River North









Fire Behavior on July 2 & 3

- July 2:
 - Lightning ignited the fire on afternoon of July 2
 South end of Main Ridge (Hell's Gate Ridge)
- July 3:
 - First report, July 3, 1100 hrs, Garfield Co Sheriff to Grand Junction BLM

 - BLM Grand Junction dispatch requested 8 jumpers, air tanker & lead plane BLM Engine 611 arrived, did size-up (saw two trees burning) & assessed low potential. BLM District FMO agreed. Aircraft diverted Red Flag (lightning-high winds), 40 new fires, high to extreme fire

 - Continued as backing fire in surface litter of leaves, twigs and grasses
 - Low intensity downslope spread with occasional short duration upslope runs and torching in Gambel Oak
 - $\ensuremath{\mathsf{FMO}}$ requested more firefighting resources & requested divert of others

Fire Behavior on July 4



- 1200 hrs: 3 acres
- Red Flag Warning issued & still many fires

- Higher priority given
 1450 hrs: concerned
 resident
 1830 hrs: BLM engine &
 FS FF's decide to attack
 July 5
- 2000 hrs (approx.) air observer "...steep, inaccessible, burning NE, few escape routes, actively burning copter with buckets would be effective
- 2200 hrs: 11 acres

Fire Behavior on July 5

- BLM crew of 7 FF's walked to fire from East Drainage. Cut Helispot 1 (H-1) & began fireline down to West Drainage
- Spread downslope through day with intermittent flare-ups & upslope runs IC ordered another eng, copter & 20-person crew (8 jumpers substituted for crew)
- Air drop near H-1. IC & pilot agreed more drops ineffective
- Another air drop near I-70 1730 hrs: IC and crew walked down
- 1745 hrs. 8 jumpers parachute to fire. IC tells them to work H-1 down to drainage. Jumper-in-Charge advises IC fire crossed fireline & requested 2 Type 1 crews
- Many unburned islands
- End of day: 50 acres
- Fire active burning approx. 77 additional acres during night

-		

Fire Behavior & Activity on July 6, 0000 to 1520 hrs.

- 0030 hrs: Jumpers abandon line east side of fire 0430 hrs: 11 BLM FF's walk to fire & clear H-2 0530 hrs: Jumper-in-Charge orders copter 0600 hrs: 127 acres


- 0600 hrs: 127 acres
 0730 hrs: NWS fire weather forecast predicts Red Flag Warning for high winds
 Still downslope burning with isolated torching & heating during mid day
 0845 hrs: IC & JIC discuss plan-Improve Ridge Fireline & start West Fireline
 0900 hrs: IC & some jumpers hear NOAA wind radio broadcast
 0930 hrs: Copter 93-R arrives. IC & JIC recon fire.
 1030 hrs: 8 more jumpers drop to fire
 1230 hrs: 10 Fr's from Prineville HS crew arrives at H-2 & most start down West
 Fireline


- Fireline
 1300 hrs: Flare-up on West Flank
 1400 hrs: Overcast sky & gusty winds
 1500 hrs: 10 more Prineville HS FF's arrive & widen Main Ridge fireline
 1510 hrs: Hot spot near Double Draws
 1520 hrs: dry cold front; winds 30-45 mph in bottom West Drainage

Fire on July 6 at 1300 Hrs.


Fire Behavior & Activity on July 6, 1520 to 2100 hrs.


- 1520 hrs: dry cold front; winds 30-45 mph in bottom West Drainage
 1530 hrs: Erratic winds on West Fireline
 1545 hrs: Flare-up near Double Draws
 1553 hrs: Winds approx. 45 mph on Main Ridge
 1555 hrs: Several upslope, crown runs near Double Draws, SW side
 1555 hrs: Several upslope, crown runs near Double Draws, SW side
 1602 hrs: Smoke coming from bottom of West Drainage, near Double Draws; Fire
 across drainage
 1603 hrs: Fire running upcanyon near the Bowl
 1604 hrs: Spot seen on east side of West Drainage
 1605 hrs: More spot fires across Main Ridge
 1609 hrs: Fire running rapidly upcanyon and upslope toward Main Ridge
 1611 hrs: IC advises Grand Junction dispatch that fire running & needed AT's
 1615 hrs: Fire crosses Main Ridge
 2100 hrs (approx): Fire reached 2,115 acres















The Blowup at 1610 Hrs. Walked 1108' for about 5 mins. Ran 317' with tools



General Work Areas

- Main Ridge (Hell's Gate Ridge)
- Lunch Spot Ridge
- West Flank Fireline
- Helispot 2 & ICP

The Main Ridge Workforce • Prineville Hotshots • BLM/USFS - Bill Baker - Todd Abbott Todd AbbottButch Blanco (IC) - Kip Gray Tony JohnsonBrian Lee Jim ByersEric Christianson Louie Navarro Mike Hayes - Loren Paulson Tom Rambo Brian RushMichelle Ryerson Alex Robertson - Bryan Scholz (Foreman) Tom Shepard (Superintendent) Neal Shrunk - Mike Simmons Kim Valentine






The West Fireline Workforce


- Prineville Hotshots
 Kathi Beck, Prineville HS
 Tami Bickett, Prineville HS, Squad Boss
 - Scott Blecha, Prineville HS
 - Levi Brinkley, Prineville HSDoug Dunbar, Prineville HS
 - Terri Hagen, Prineville HS


 - Bonnie Holtby, Prineville HS
 Rob Johnson, Prineville HS
 Jon Kelso, Prineville HS, Squad Boss
- Derek BrixeyBrad Haugh
- USFS
 - Sonny Archuleta Sarah Doehring
 - Kevin Erickson
 - Eric Hipke Don Mackey, JIC
 - Roger RothJim Thrash










































The Lunch Spot Ridge Workforce • USFS - Michael Cooper - Mike Feliciano - Dale Longanecker - Tony Petrilli - Quentin Rhoades - Eric Shelton - Sonny Soto - Bill Thomas - Keith Woods




































Two Rivers Park
Memorial Site,
Glenwood
Springs, Colorado
(Colorado &
Roaring Fork
Rivers confluence)









Investigation Report Findings	
investigation Report I maings	
Three Factors that Changed Fire Behavior	
 Steep, complex topography 	
 Strong, turbulent & variable winds 	
 Involvement of live fuels 	
Predicted Fire Behavior	
 July 6 fire behavior could have been predicted on basis of fuels, weather 	
& topography	
 Fire behavior info not requested nor provided 	
 Critical info not available for developing strategy & tactics 	

Fire Support Structure

- Above normal fire activity overtaxed relatively small local firefighting organization
- Local dispatch did not provide clear understanding of what resources would be provided.
- Unclear priority setting between local dispatch center & local firefighting organization resulted in confusion about priorities, operating procedures & resource availability
- Lack of management oversight, technical guidance & direction to local firefighters

Strategy & Tactics

- Escape routes & safety zones were inadequate for burning conditions
- Most of West Flank effort was hazardous
- Most of Downhill Fireline Construction Guidelines were not followed
- Did not compensate for changes in observed or potential extreme fire behavior
- There was a question of whom was the incident commander
- There was no organizational division of labor, i.e. divisions, etc.

Safety Briefing & Major Concerns

- With fire's potential, escape route along West Flank was too long & steep
- 8 of 10 of Standard Firefighting Orders were compromised
- 12 of 18 Watch Out Situations were compromised
- Downhill Firefighting Guidelines were compromised
- Prineville HS were not briefed on local conditions, fuels or fire weather forecasts
- Air support was inadequate
- Any suppression was delayed until Day #2 with major suppression only started late on Day #4
- IC & Jumper-In-Charge never had chance to communicate prior to morning of July 6

Equipment

- Two FF's never had fire shelters
- Don't take fusees or packs into shelters
- Wind and fire intensity & spread prevented effective fire shelter deployment
- Carrying tools & packs slowed fire escape efforts

Storm King Mountain 2000

Let's Safely Do It Again!

Size-Up Components

- Get the FACTS
- Generate the PROBABILITIES
- Inventory the RESOURCES
- Make a DECISION (Strategy = IAP = Objectives = "What")
- Implement the PLAN OF OPERATIONS (Tactics = "How")

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Developing Facts & Probabilities

- Map fire & locate fire in relation to hazards & risks
- Determine advantage control points/locations
- Evaluate probabilities in relation to risk to FF's, civilians, property & the environment
- Evaluate current & expected resource availability
- · Evaluate direct vs. indirect attack

Safety Considerations

- Determine LOOKOUT LOCATIONS
- Establish COMMUNICATIONS
- Determine & establish ESCAPE ROUTES
- Determine and establish SAFETY ZONES
- Know and keep FF accountability information

Develop Strategy-Incident Objectives

- DIRECT:
- INITIAL ACTION ESCAPE:


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41

Develop & Implement Tactics


- Use integrated ground & air attack
- Hit hard with air attack (air tankers & copters) before committing ground FF's to Main Ridge
- Watch tactics driven by transportation needs


Overall Major Considerations

- Always consider risk vs. gain
- Think risk management
- Supervisors redeem role as supervisor
- Be aware of group think mentality





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


























To Jim Roth and Storm King Fire	
Shelter Technologies:	
Thank you very much.	
Firefighters will be much better	
off due to your work to improve fire shelters!	
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