

# **BLUE SHEET**

## **Preliminary Summary Report**

### **Los Angeles Fire Department**



## **STRUCTURE FIRE WITH FIREFIGHTER INJURIES**

**4008 N. SUMAC DR.**

**May 4, 2013**

This Preliminary Summary Report is intended as a safety and training tool, and to provide factual information from the first 72 hours of the incident review. To that end, it is published and distributed within a short time frame. Information contained within this report is subject to revision as further investigation is conducted, and additional information is received.

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**SUMMARY**

On May 4, 2013, two Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) members were injured while working at a structure fire Incident No. 1 at 4008 North Sumac Drive in the Sherman Oaks area of the City (Fire Station 99's first-in district). The structure was a three-story hillside single-family dwelling with fire on the first sub-floor level. Both injured members were treated for minor burn injuries and released from the hospital.

**NARRATIVE**

On May 4, 2013 at 0002 hours, the LAFD responded to a reported structure fire at 4008 North Sumac Drive. Upon arrival, resources encountered a three-story hillside single-family dwelling (two stories below grade level) with fire showing. During the incident two firefighters sustained non-life-threatening burn injuries and were transported to the hospital.

On the initial deployment of resources, three engine companies were assigned fire attack and entered the building at the street level on the (A) Alpha side of the structure. A 360 of the building was not completed, and as a result, the involved building was not "reconned" to determine the exact fire location prior to entry. The majority of fire was located on the floor directly below them, on the first floor level below grade (Sub1). When fire attack commenced, vertical ventilation had not taken place above the fire and there was no effort to synchronize entry with roof ventilation. The interior attack companies were immediately confronted with extremely high levels of heat and zero visibility. Three members were separated and lost in a small bedroom/office approx 10' from the front door. One of the lost members requested assistance from the roof in getting himself and the two other members out of the structure. Neither the Incident Commander (IC) nor the Safety Officer (SOFR) heard this message. Emergency Traffic was communicated over the tactical fireground frequency by another one of the members which was also not heard or acknowledged by the IC or the SOFR. Two of the separated members pulled the now semi-conscious member (who had run out of air on his SCBA) to safety. A Light Force that was reassigned to RIC met the members exiting from the building along with the semi-conscious member on the front porch and removed him from the area. Both members were transported to area hospitals and were placed off duty as a result of their injuries. One of the involved company officers did not utilize the thermal imaging camera (TIC) and it was later destroyed in the fire. The second involved officer did not have a TIC assigned to his company.

**SAFETY ISSUES FOR REVIEW**

- Book 101 Rapid Intervention Company, Chapter 4 – Firefighter Emergency Overview, Chapter 9 – Emergency Traffic Communications, Chapter 20 – Interior Firefighting Watch-Out Situations
- Training Bulletin No. 76 Company Operations, Parts "A" and "B"
- Book 11 Communications Manual PP 3-10

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- Book 30 Command Procedures – “Division/Group Supervisors will be responsible for, and in control of, all assigned activities within their Division/Group. This requires each Division/Group Supervisor to”:
  - Report Conditions, Actions, and Needs at regular intervals to IC/Operations Section Chief (OSC).
  - Complete objectives assigned by the Incident Commander
  - Account for all assigned personnel
- Book 30 Command procedures – The Standards of Command
- Manual of Operation, Volume III - SCBA, Emergency escape filter cartridge, and buddy breathing procedures
- Clear identification of below grade floors. Ground level – Division 1, first level below grade – Sub 1, second level below grade – Sub 2, etc.
- Training Bulletin No. 106 LCES and Watch-Outs for Structure Fires
- Training Bulletin No. 139 – Air Management Policy/NFPA 1404
- Training Bulletin No. 90 Fire Burns, #V
- On all structure fires, and in particular, multi-level hillside homes, every effort should be made, prior to advancing hose lines, to perform a 360, “take a lap”, around the entire structure to determine the exact fire location and most effective path to advance hose lines. This information must then be communicated to the I/C and all companies.
- The most advantageous place to begin advancing a hose line into a structure is at the fire level or below, **not above the fire**. Entering the structure above the fire can be unsafe and ineffective.
- Fire location, accessibility, and identification of “below grade” floors.
- Departmental Bulletin No. 12-13 – Firefighter Burn Injuries

